In the post-World War II world economic order, international economic relations have conventionally been regarded as an area reserved for state-to-state relations and to some extent global administrative actors (international and regional organisations).
Introduction
In the 21 st century, the core disciplines of international economic interactions (i.e. trade, investment and finance) which were erstwhile reserved exclusively for state-to-state regulation have over the years opened up to an ever increasing array of global administrative actors (international and regional organisations), sub-national actors and non-state actors (civil societies). With the changing dynamics, international and regional organisations have found it relatively easier than sub-national governments and civil societies to gain acceptance as legitimate actors in international relations. The former used the mandate acquired from
States as a spring board to progressively gain prominence on the international stage, while the latter have struggled to break into the fold mainly because they do not conform to the recognised hierarchy of Westphalian statehood.
In relation to sub-national actors (which is the focus of this paper), 2 their engagement in international economic relations is deeply grounded in a history of scepticism. For a better part of the 20th century, the participation of sub-national actors in international relations was perceived to be unpredictable and in some instances disruptive of the existing status quo. See KC Wheare, Federal Government (4th ed OUP 1963) 183-186; Ivan Bernier, International Legal Aspects of Federalism (Longman 1973) 1-6. 4 Ordinarily, negotiation comes before implementation, however, implementation has conventionally been an area of sub-national participation because, sub-national divisions are closer to the grassroots where implementation of policy takes place. What is considered abnormal is when sub-national governments become involved in negotiation of, and or sign international economic agreements.
Trade Agreement (CETA). As such, there has been sustained criticism and activism against the negotiation and implementation of these economic agreements. 5 In view of these changing protocols, there has been a noticeable shift in the perception of central governments and global administrative organisations about sub-national engagement in foreign economic activities. Although this changing paradigm is still at its infancy, it is gaining traction among federal countries. Notably, established federal systems such as Canada, Belgium, India, Argentina and the USA out of necessity and/or pragmatism are adapting their international economic regimes to accommodate the input of these stakeholders (albeit to varying degrees, using different institutional mechanisms). 6 Interestingly, even with more States making accommodation for sub-national governments in their international trade processes, it is questionable if there is any coherent pattern discernable from these case studies. Notably, there is ambivalence in the way these actors are conceptualised in international economic law. This is mainly because there is a dichotomy between the recognition of these actors within the applicable laws (i.e. international conventions, multilateral and regional trade agreements) in the international fora and the emerging framework for accommodating their interests within domestic national law. This has led to distinct variations in the methods and scope of domestic accommodation for subnational engagement in foreign economic activities across-board. Ordinarily the existence of variations in domestic accommodation mechanisms is expected due to the differences in the way each country is politically set up. However, the challenge with this approach is that there is the propensity to isolate these occurrences as purely domestic measures that have no implications or connections with what happens on the international scene. With such a 5 See Par Roosevelt Namur, 'Good news! The war on TTIP and CETA can be won' Pour Écrire la Liberté [blog site] (May 10 2016) available at <http://www.pour.press/good-news-the-war-on-ttip-and-ceta-can-bewon/> accessed 15 September 2016; Helena Spongenberg, 'European cities and regions rally to stop TTIP' (April 25 2016) available at https://euobserver.com/regions/133173 accessed 15 September 2016. The central grouse in these publications is that sub-national governments and civil societies are concerned that new mega regional FTAs are not being negotiated transparently and that there is lack of clarity on the scope of powers that these agreements would give to international corporations at the expense of small and medium-sized businesses.
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For example, the Forum of Federations conducted a comprehensive study of the changing constitutional and institutional role of sub-national governments in foreign interactions of federal systems in 2007. This study selected 12 federal systems for appraisal. This study was part of a series themed 'A Global Dialogue on Federalism.' The countries selected for appraisal on the topic of foreign relations were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, India, Malaysia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and To answer this research question, this paper evaluates the current status of sub-national actors in the international trade interactions of two federal systems -Belgium and Canada. These two countries have been selected for appraisal because they are both federal countries, which have adopted distinctively dissimilar models for assimilating the participation of sub-national actors into their international trade interactions. Canada is very informal and flexible; on the other hand Belgium is more formal and institutionalised. Thus, it would be interesting to see if there are any commonalities that link both countries, which in turn can be projected as distinct themes that can help with broader interpretations and understanding of the phenomenon.
The central argument of this paper is that in the emerging discourse on sub-national participation in international economic interactions of federal systems, there are areas of commonality discernible, irrespective of the differing domestic constitutional settings in which sub-national actors are operating in these two countries. The analysis in this paper would show that even though the experiences in Canada and Belgium may be different (especially in terms of the levels of formalism associated with sub-national activity in international trade interactions), their areas of commonality, should not go unnoticed because they are crucial to a holistic conceptualisation of the evolving role of these actors in the 21 st century international trade process.
Contextualising the analysis: Federal countries and the conventional norm on subnational engagement in international relations
Federal systems have always been at the forefront of the controversies surrounding subnational participation in international relations.
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This is because historically, international law 7 See Bernier, (n 3) 1-6; Wheare, (n 3).
responded to the appearance of federal states by ignoring their constitutional peculiarities and sought to treat them like other sovereign states. 8 In line with this approach, the general rule which has existed in international law for the better part of the Westphalian era of statehood is that federal systems have a responsibility to ensure that the acts or omissions of their subnational governments do not infringe on international law obligations which the State is subject to.
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This responsibility is not negated even in situations where the internal law of a federal system does not give the central government powers to compel its sub-national governments.
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This obligation applies as the default rule unless a contrary intention is evidenced in the text of an international treaty.
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In some instances, international treaties have 'opt out' clauses negotiated into them. have over the years attempted to fill the gap left by the absence of a general customary international law rule specifying the required measures.
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Tracing the GATT/WTO practices to the early years of the post-WW2 era, Brenier points out that at the inception of multilateral cooperation in international relations, the scope of international law was widening and the emerging international instruments during this period started taking into consideration the peculiar problems posed by federal systems. 16 Thus, the potential conflict arising from the possibility that sub-national governments in federal systems could act at cross purposes with the treaty obligations of the federal system was foreseen during the negotiation process for the new multilateral trade order in the aftermath of WW2.
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During the 1946 GATT and ITO preparatory session within the UN, the challenge posed by federal systems on compliance with the proposed GATT was apparent because a number of proposals were put forward by negotiating parties such as Australia and the US, seeking to ensure that compliance by federal systems was guaranteed. The issues relating to the application and effect of federal systems' compliance with GATT/WTO agreements did not disappear, even with the final agreed version of art XXIV:
12 which was inserted in the GATT 1947. Rather, the historical evolution of this federal compliance clause was marked by unresolved ambiguities regarding the extent and scope of the obligations imposed on federal nation/states to secure compliance by their sub-national governments.
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For example, during the GATT years of the multilateral trade system (i.e. before the introduction of the WTO) some interpretations suggested that the effect and scope of 'reasonable measures' under art XXIV: 12 were not intended to be compelling or mandatory for the contracting parties to the GATT. From the foregoing, it appears that a lack of consensus on the interpretation of what measures should be taken by federal countries to keep their sub-national divisions in check is a reflection of the general intolerance towards sub-national actors interfering with the international trade obligations of States in the international system. It is also an indication that the multilateral trade system was designed in a manner to give room for wide interpretations to States as to how they should handle what was considered a domestic/internal affair. As such, the response of each State towards growing agitations by sub-national divisions for improved engagement with international economic regimes has developed differently. This makes it increasingly difficult to coherently make sense of why and how these actors operate.
In the next section, the scope of sub-national engagement in the international trade process will be examined through the lens of two federal case studies -Canada and Belgium.
Sub-national participation in international trade relations: a deviation from the norm
In this section of the paper, the focus would be on the changing dynamics of sub-national participation in the international trade mechanisms of Belgium and Canada. The analysis would highlight areas of constitutional and institutional changes that have occurred in the way sub-national governments in these two countries.
Canada in focus
Generally, the constitutional configuration of the federal system in Canada is premised on a relationship where the provinces have considerable autonomy from the central government in The only reference to the central government's role in international relations under the Constitution Act, 1867 is found in s 132, which grants the Dominion the authority to implement treaties negotiated by Great Britain. In summary, cooperation between Ottawa and the provinces on matters relating to international trade negotiations has been the most distinct expression of how Canada is making adjustments to accommodate sub-national governments as stakeholders in the changing landscape of international trade interactions in Canada. There have been calls for this model to be transplanted to other policy areas such as labour and the environment.
By the time the Tokyo Round began in 1973, however, GATT's focus had shifted to the difficult issue of non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Negotiations on visible tariffs were replaced by discussions of subsidies, government procurement, and other technical barriers.

Sectoral negotiations on fisheries, resource-based products, and agriculture also involved areas of provincial jurisdiction. This is why the Provinces demanded direct consultation with Ottawa. The federal government understood that, given the scope of the issues involved, it would need the support of the Provinces in order to negotiate a binding international agreement under GATT's federal state clause.
68
In addition, constitutional formalisation of the existing channels of cooperation has been demanded by some provinces but rejected by Ottawa.
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Although the system is without any formal constitutional entrenchment, its development over the years has been instrumental to maintaining a delicate balance between the provinces and the central government at Ottawa.
More importantly, this model portrays a perspective about sub-national involvement in international interactions which is moderate and cautious. This model will subsequently be compared with the next case study -Belgium.
Belgium in focus
Belgium is a complex federal country made up of three Communities (the Flemish Community, the French Community and the German-speaking Community); three Regions (the Flemish Region, the Walloon Region and the Brussels Region); and four linguistic regions (the Dutch-speaking region, the French speaking region, the bilingual region of Brussels-Capital and the German-speaking region).
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In view of the multifarious composition of the Belgian state, the federal system in operation in Belgium has evolved in tandem with these peculiar diversities. 
Committee on Foreign Policy (ICFP).
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The ICFP Secretariat is maintained by the Foreign Service in charge of relations with Communities and Regions.
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It does not meet on a regular basis with an average of two meetings happening per year. 91 Therefore, the system also relies on informal meetings between cabinet-level personnel and civil servants from both levels of government.
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The primary objective of this committee is to minimise friction in the coordination mechanism on foreign policy by dealing with political conflicts.
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It achieves this through a mechanism of dialogue and information exchange between the centre and the regions.
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From the foregoing, it is clear that compliance with international trade norms in Belgium is designed to be a product of joint participation by the central government and regional governments under a formalised and constitutionally recognised framework.
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As such, Belgium's compliance with international trade agreements is negotiated by all stakeholders and any decision reached is deemed to be the common position of the Belgian state. 
Common themes: Cooperation and mutual interests
From the details of the existing relationships between the provinces/regions and the central governments in the two countries discussed above, the differences are obvious. As such, this paper will not dwell on these differences. The main focus of this section is to identify common themes that unify both case studies. More so, although the scope of cooperation is not restricted only to dialogue in Belgium but also extends to 'permitted policy action' taken by sub-national governments, these permitted policy actions are usually coordinated and supervised by the central government using the constitutional mechanisms discussed in the previous section. In essence, the process is still This is an important point because it is a reflection of the difficulty all sub-national governments experience attaining legitimacy in the international scene. Essentially, their limitations and restrictions come to the fore. Sub-national governments in Belgium are not faring better than their counterparts in Canada, even though they have a more formalised mandate to engage in the international economic processes. This is also not perceived as a triumph of the existing international regime which still frowns on sub-national engagement in foreign activities. Rather it is a reflection of the reality that the legitimacy of sub-national actors on the international scene is at its infancy.
Second, the level of engagement between sub-national governments and central governments on international trade negotiation (in both countries) is clearly being driven by growing mutual interests (between sub-national governments and central governments) on specific cross-cutting issues which new breed international economic agreements now cover. Also, the level of engagement (between sub-national governments and central governments) in both countries is being shaped by the differing priorities attached to specific trade topics.
To illustrate the significance of this point, this paper draws on Criekeman's 98 arguments about the factors that motivate or repel cooperation among levels of government. He
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The system is not closed to non -governmental actors in the process of cooperation. But the primary focus of the discussions in this paper is on sub-national actors in federal systems as stakeholders in international economic relations. distinguishes between 'conflictual' and 'cooperational' issues, arguing that areas, which are 'conflictual', are usually less amenable to strong cooperation between levels of government.
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In this instance, the argument in this paper is that both 'conflictual' and 'cooperational' issues are spurring more sub-national engagement in international trade interactions in Canada and Belgium. The issues that are conflictual represent the areas in which the sub-national governments disagree with the central government and as such are therein agitating for different negotiating positions. Cooperational issues on the other hand, are those areas where both parties are in agreement or at least amenable to agreement. In such areas, sub-national governments are working more closely (in both countries) to achieve common negotiating positions.
The Canadian experience shows that Ottawa (irrespective of the less formal system) has had to demonstrate a sense of commitment to implementing the mechanisms for cooperation between them and the provincial governments even in areas that are 'conflictual' or risk having the provinces exploit the loopholes and ambivalence in the constitutional provisions to take counterproductive action.
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This could occur if the provinces dissent to the adoption of a negotiating position adopted by the central government. As Gerken points out, the power of dissent is another way in which the sub-national governments (this encompasses a broader scope of minority state and non-state actors in a federal system) can contribute to the policy process in federal systems.
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The effectiveness of dissent as a tool for facilitating cooperation in the area of international trade relations is identifiable in the Canadian experience. For example, during the Doha multilateral negotiation and the NAFTA negotiation processes, the provinces' objection to certain issues was reflected in the final negotiation position adopted by Canada. Irrespective of the differences in approach of Canada and Belgium, another area of commonality is that both systems are designed to explore practical methods for balancing national and state power in relation to specific subject areas, which are of mutual interest to both levels of government. This shifts the focus from regulatory autonomy and potentially reduces the possibility of clamours for secession within these States. Both systems place emphasis on the need for sub-national participation in the policy formulation process, instead of pursuing state regulatory autonomy. 
1.5
Conclusion: Implications for the future
As was pointed out in the analysis on how federal systems have impacted the design and evolution of international trade rules, sub-national governments and foreign economic interactions are ordinarily perceived as 'strange bedfellows'. As such, it is possible to down play the significance of sub-national engagement in the international scene because they are still largely nuanced expressions occurring mainly within the domestic settings of their home states. The danger with such assumptions is that we could miss the distinct patterns, which should draw our attention to the opportunities and challenges that are associated with this emerging phenomenon. When engaged in conversations with people about my area of research, it seems amusing to some to even suggest that sub-national governments have a role to play in international trade (either as actors or regulators). The reality is that sub-national governments will always struggle to project themselves as distinct international trade stakeholders because their engagement in this sphere is undoubtedly fraught with challenges.
However, the case studies in this paper should remind us that the world where sub-national 
